_edited.png)
February 1, 2024 marks three years since the military in Myanmar violently dislodged the civilian government, dissolved the parliament, declared a state of emergency, and arrested nearly every prominent political leader, including Nobel laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi.
But, unlike in the past, the people of Myanmar have challenged the 2021 coup with historic defiance, persistence, and organisation. The regime, led by Min Aung Hlaing, today faces the wrath of not just ethnic minorities, who have long opposed the Burmese military-state, but also the ethnic majority – Bamars – from which it once drew political fodder and social legitimacy.
Since October, when three powerful ethnic armed organisations launched coordinated offensives against junta targets in northern Myanmar, the military has struggled to keep its head above the water. It has lost large swathes of territory to revolutionary forces. Entire battalions have surrendered without a fight, the latest one being in Rakhine State. Even its neutral partners and long-time allies, such as pro-talks ethnic armed groups and subordinate border militias, are abandoning the sinking ship that is the “State Administration Council”. Most of all, the top boss himself is facing rising internal opposition.
Not to forget the unfathomable human costs of the putsch: more than 4,400 killed, 25,000 arrested, and 2.6 million internally displaced, all since February 2021. Despite these, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India continues to formally engage with (only) the junta. It has had conversations with pro-democracy entities since the coup, but these have been no more than informal, below-the-radar, or at times, purely tactical, engagements that haven’t resulted in any policy shift at the highest levels of the government.
One could argue that India continues to formally engage the junta because of its entrenched geopolitical interests in Myanmar. Three key objectives become salient here: securing and stabilising the India-Myanmar border, maintaining and strengthening economic ties, and balancing the Chinese presence.
But, these are inadequate in explaining why New Delhi hasn’t yet formalised its engagement with the democratic forces in Myanmar. In fact, one could even argue that if it was really about fulfilling key strategic objectives and protecting its “national interests”, India should have already engaged the democratic side.
There are three deeper structural and ideological factors that explain the orthodox, pro-junta posture of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government.
One, the Indian political and security establishments are path dependent on working with the Myanmar military.
Since the early 1990s, New Delhi, guided by a strictly realpolitik logic, has abidingly worked with successive military regimes in the country. The end of the Cold War and the opening up of the Indian economy in quick succession created an overwhelming incentive within the Indian foreign policy system to prioritise economic growth and strategic outreach over idealism. The result was a cold, arithmetic mantra – work with whoever is in power in the Burmese capital.
This path dependency became even stronger in the last decade, as the Modi government fortified relations with the Myanmar military. Importantly, it did so despite the democratic transition next door, which brought Aung San Suu Kyi to power in a free-and-fair election. While New Delhi embraced her administration with open arms, its continued to believe that the military wasn’t going anywhere anytime soon.
In fact, there was a surge in bilateral activity between the defence establishments in New Delhi and Naypyitaw after 2015. High-profile mutual visits of senior def-sec officials, joint counterinsurgency operations along the border, military training exercises, sale of heavy military hardware (such as torpedoes and submarines) – the Modi government really gave it all to invest in Min Aung Hlaing’s military. All of this was designed to fortify the Indian presence at China’s doorsteps and create strategic depth in the Bay of Bengal region.
New Delhi has found it difficult to break out of this path dependency – some would say, overreliance – after the 2021 coup. It is predisposed to believing that the military remains a formidable political force in Myanmar that is facing serious challenges, but will eventually “stabilise” the country like it has in the past.
On Myanmar, there is another legacy impulse to which India remains hostage: working with a prominent civilian leader. New Delhi was very much taken in by Suu Kyi because of her towering global image, undisputed dominance in domestic politics, and past connections with India. The 2021 coup and the multi-ethnic revolution that came in its wake pushed her into oblivion. New Delhi barely recognises the new faces populating the current pro-democracy spectrum, including the senior leadership of the National Unity Government (NUG).
So, suggestions made to New Delhi on talking to the NUG are often returned with a cross-question: whom should we talk to?
It is a different matter that the Modi government hasn’t done enough to familiarise itself with the new generation of leaders, many of them millennials and Gen Z, who are leading the anti-junta front with both grit and sophistication. When the junta falls, which should be soon, it is this leadership that will take charge of Myanmar’s affairs.
Two, under the Modi government, decision-making on Myanmar – like on many other fronts – has become overly centralised. In the process, it has become heavily securitised.
A lot rests on a few senior figureheads, among whom the National Security Advisor (NSA), his two deputies, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command play critical roles. These offices have always been pivotal in shaping India’s neighbourhood policies. But, the Modi government, through bureaucratic restructuring, has made some of them even more powerful.
It has, for instance, elevated the NSA – Ajit Doval – to cabinet rank, allowing him to call the shots on a host of issues that were earlier outside of his office’s remit. It has also created the CDS’ post from scratch. Although the CDS cannot override decisions taken by individual service chiefs, she/he can informally dismiss their considerations. Since the CDS is the highest-ranking military officer in the system, service chiefs could find it difficult to reject her/his advice. Such a structure risks creating a closed feedback loop.
Sure, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is also involved in crafting India’s Myanmar policy. But, it seems to be doing little more than delivering soft statements on restoration of democracy and protection of border security, maintaining a diplomatic presence in Yangon, hosting the occasional cultural functions and business conclaves at the embassy, and facilitating secretarial-level engagement with the junta’s senior leadership. All routine, low-stakes activities.